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Abstract: The Hall-Roeger methodology for the testing of market power is applied to Irish
manufacturing industries for the period 1991-1999. The paper adapts their methodology to permit
discrimination between input and output-price-based sources of market power. The empirical
results do not indicate much evidence of significant imperfect competition in output markets but
the results do point to evidence of market power in certain input markets and in some industrial
sectors. The implications of these findings are discussed.
I INTRODUCTION
T
his paper applies a test for market power, originally proposed by Hall
(1988) and subsequently modified by Roeger (1995), to Irish
manufacturing industries using the Census of Industrial Production (CIP)
database for the period 1991 to 1999.
Our interest in testing for market power in Irish manufacturing industries
is motivated by two overall concerns: one macroeconomic and one
microeconomic. The inability of most Irish firms to influence the prices paid
for their outputs or inputs, and especially those exposed to international
competition in foreign and domestic markets, has long been accepted as
central to the characterisation of Ireland as the classic case of the small open
economy.1 Evidence for this view has largely been confined to aggregate level
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1 Geary’s (1974) paper is generally credited with emphasising the relevance of price-taking
behaviour in an Irish context.analyses. Browne in a number of papers (1982, 1983 and 1984) presents strong
evidence that price-taking behaviour in output markets is a more than
reasonable assumption. His analyses were conducted at the level of aggregate
exports and hence it is always possible that his findings could obscure the
presence of potential market power in some sectors of manufacturing industry.
The only study, that we are aware of, that sets out to test the price-taking
assumption in output markets for sub-sectors of Irish manufacturing industry
has been undertaken by Callan and Fitz Gerald (1989). Their study first
confirms price-taking behaviour at the level of aggregate manufacturing
industry. Their tests for sub-sectors of manufacturing industry are conducted
at the two-digit level and their findings strongly support price-taking
behaviour at this level of aggregation. It is also possible, however, that, just
like Browne’s findings, the two-digit level of aggregation masks the exercise of
market power at lower levels. This study adds to this empirical literature by
conducting tests of market power at the four-digit manufacturing level. 
The ability to conduct tests of market power at the lowest possible level of
aggregation of firm groupings2 is also highly desirable when we want to focus
on the potential exercise of market power to impose excessive cost burdens on
particular economic agents. In an Irish context, the establishment of the
Competition Authority in 1991, and especially its acquisition of enhanced
powers in 1996, has focused attention on the existence of market power and its
possible abuse (see Massey and Daly, 2003). In turn, the employment of robust
empirical tests of market power has assumed a practical relevance in the
context of the requirement to provide a potential evidential basis for legal
interventions. Thus a second motivation for this paper is to explore the
evidence for the presence of market power at the four-digit manufacturing
industry level which may have relevance in the context of competition policy.
We also believe that the methodology that we employ in the testing of market
power could have a potential evidential role in certain legal interventions. 
A feature both of the macro-level studies and much of the micro-level
inquiries concerning price-taking behaviour is that they are most always
concerned with the potential exercise of market power in output markets. Both
the buyers and sellers of inputs can of course also exercise market power.
While the presence and exercise of market power in input markets is a lower
order of concern in terms of potential welfare losses, it is not unimportant and
thus the fact that it is an issue which is virtually ignored in empirical studies
of market power is, to say the least, a curious omission. 
Alan Manning (2003) has recently supplied a number of cogent reasons as
to why we should be concerned about monopsony power in particular. For
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2 Ideally one would like to focus at the firm level but this is not feasible given the available data.instance, it is a well-known result that if we assume monopsony power in
labour markets, employment is predicted to increase in the wake of the
introduction of, or, an increase in minimum wages. This has assumed practical
relevance in an Irish context since the introduction of the minimum wage in
April 2000. Apart from the labour input, the concern over monopsony power
may also be relevant for other inputs. A particularly interesting case is the
purchase of primary agricultural produce for further processing. In the US,
farmer suppliers of tobacco are generally considered to have suffered from the
abuse of monopsony power at the hands of the powerful tobacco
manufacturing companies (see Raper, Love and Shumway, 2000).
(Interestingly, these companies were found to also possess market power in
their output markets.) This example has an interesting echo in an Irish
context. Irish beef producers have periodically complained that they have been
subject to abuse of market power by the Irish beef-processing sector (see
Bonner, McCarthy and Sheehy, 2000).3
Rather than dismissing the potential of monopsony power as a theoretical
curiosity, we contend that it would be much preferable to test for its presence. 
Sellers of inputs can of course also exercise market power. The level of
concentration among the providers of utilities like electricity and fuel, for
instance, tends to be very high and the potential for excessive pricing is
correspondingly high. Also the sellers of some professional services may also
be capable of exercising market power. These possibilities warrant empirical
testing. 
Thus another motivation for our paper is to explicitly consider the evidence
for both input and output price sources of market power. 
The paper is laid out as follows. Section II sets out the methodology
employed in testing for market power. The methodology is based on that
proposed by Hall and Roeger and, as far as we are aware, ours is the first
application in an Irish context. In Section III we first describe the variables
used in the empirical analysis that are drawn from the Irish Central Statistics
Office (CSO), Census of Industrial Production (CIP) four-digit level electronic
database. We then present and interpret the test results and in Section IV we
make some concluding remarks.
II THE HALL-ROEGER TEST FOR MARKET POWER
While there are a number of approaches that could potentially be employed
to test for the presence of market power, the Hall-Roeger approach has a
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3 Similar concerns have been expressed from time to time about the exercise of market power by
the Irish sugar- processing industry.number of relatively attractive features that commend it for our purposes.4
For one, their approach does not require the specification of particular
functional forms that can affect the results produced by the more traditional
approaches. Second, their methodology is relatively parsimonious in terms of
data requirements which is a most important consideration when one wants
to undertake analysis of market power at the four-digit manufacturing
industry level.
The Hall-Roeger methodology is set out here using Roeger’s approach as we
use this method in our empirical application but an essentially similar
elucidation can be provided using the Hall method.
Roeger’s methodology, which is derivative of Hall’s, shows that, apart from
a random error term that captures measurement error, the difference between
the quantity and price-based Solow residuals should vanish under the null
hypothesis of perfect competition in product and input markets. Thus, suppose
a firm’s technology can be characterised by a two-input constant-returns-to-
scale production function, then
SR – SRP = [(∆y + ∆p) – (∆x1 + ∆w1)] 
– s2*[(∆x2 + ∆w2) – (∆x1 + ∆w1)] = 0 (1)
where,
SR = quantity-based or “traditional” Solow residual,
SRP = price-based or “dual” Solow residual,
w’s = input prices,
p  = price of output, 
∆y = (log) change in gross output,
∆x’s=   (log) change in inputs, and
s2*=   cost share of input x2 in the value of output.
Suppose now we wish to test for monopoly power in the pricing of outputs.
The ‘true’ cost share (s2*) under competitive pricing may be written
w2x2         w2x2 p
s2* = ––––– = ––––– — = (1 + βmp) s2 (2)
(mc)y    (mc)y  p
and if βmp = 0, then s2* = s2,
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4 For example, Schroeter (1988) gives a good application of the so-called conjectural elasticities’
approach to the testing of market power while Massey (2000) provides an overview of some other
approaches.where,
mc = marginal cost of production,
βmp = the monopoly output-price mark up, that is, (p-mc)/mc,5
s2 = the actual cost share, defined as, w2x2/py.
If product markets were, however, characterised by monopoly behaviour,
then replacing s2* in (1) by the expression in (2), we can obtain the following
two equations for the estimation of the mark-up coefficient 
βmp
SR – SRP = –––––– [(∆y + ∆p) – (∆x1 + ∆w1)] + ε (3)
1 + βmp
SR – SRP = βmp s2[(∆x2 + ∆w2) – (∆x1 + ∆w1)] + ε (3)(a)
where,
ε = random error term.
By analogy (see Raper, Love and Shumway, 2000), suppose now purchases
of, for example, x2 in Equation (1) were subject to market power, then the cost
share term becomes s2(1+β2
ms), where β2
ms is the coefficient of input-based
market power, that is, (vmp-w2)/w2, and vmp is the marginal value product of
x2. It should be noted that this term could be either positive (implying input-
buyer power, that is, monposony) or negative (implying input-seller power).
Incorporating this expression for s2* in (1) we obtain an econometric test given
by Equation (4)
SR – SRP = β2
ms s2[(∆x2 + ∆w2) – (∆x1 + ∆w1)] + ε (4)
However, it is apparent that the estimation of (3)(a), or, (4) provides
identical information on the extent and source of departures from perfect
competition, despite 3(a) being explicitly derived from the presumption of
monopoly power in output markets. It is thus impossible by using the Hall-
Roeger methodology to discriminate between output-based and input-based
sources of imperfect competition.6 Thus, at best it is misleading to refer to
tests such as (3) or (4) as tests of “monopoly”, or, “monopsony” power, or, more
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5 This coefficient is directly related to the Lerner coefficient since, βL = βmp/(1+βmp), where, βL is
the Lerner coefficient, and for small values it will be identical.
6 Hall seems to acknowledge as much when he suggests in his concluding comments that a
possible explanation for his estimate of a relatively large and statistically significant mark-up
coefficient, which is obtained by estimating an equation like (3), could be monopsony behaviour on
the part of input purchasers.precisely as exclusively output-based, or, exclusively input-based measures of
market power. 
We now propose a simple but useful extension of the Hall-Roeger method.
Suppose we permitted (1) to be afflicted by output and input-based (x2) sources
of market power. Equation (2) now becomes
w2x2         w2x2 pv m p
s2* = ––––– = ––––– — –––– = (1 + βmp)(1 + β2
ms) s2 (5)
(mc)y    (mc)y  p   w2
where,
vmp = marginal value product of x2.
Substituting (5) for s2* in (1) we obtain an expression of the following
general form that allows for firms to exercise potential market power in both
output and input M-1 markets
j=M




sj [(∆xj + ∆wj) – (∆x1 + ∆w1)] + ε (6)
or, writing (6) using simpler notation 
j=M
v =   φj zj + ε (7)
j=2
where,
v = SR – SRP
φj = βmp + βj
ms + βj
ms βmp and
zj = sj [(∆xj + ∆wj) – (∆x1 + ∆w1)]
Suppose we obtain statistically significant estimates of the φjs from an
estimation of Equation (7). This would suggest the presence of market power
on the part of buyers and/or sellers. However, inspection of Equation (6)
implies that the non-rejection of equality of the φjs in (7) would strongly
suggest market power in the setting of output prices.7 On the other hand,
rejection of equality of the φjs would provide strong support for imperfect
competition in the pricing of inputs. The qualification attaching to the latter
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7 Inspection of Equation (6) reveals that we are excluding here the possibility that the βj
ms are all
of an equal non-zero magnitude which seems highly improbable.interpretation is that rejection of equality of the market-power coefficients
could also be consistent with imperfection competition in the pricing of both
input and output prices. If monopoly power were in reality present, the
coefficient estimates from (7) would thus be upper-bound estimates of the
extent of market power in the pricing of inputs. By forcing equality of the φjs
in (7), which would be equivalent to the estimation of Equation 3(a), we obtain
upper-bound estimates of the monopoly (output-based) power coefficients. If
these values were close to zero, and bearing in mind that they are upper-bound
estimates, it is apparent from Equation (6) that statistically significant φjs
could be interpreted as unambiguously arising from imperfect competition in
the pricing of inputs.
As previously noted, departures from perfect competition in input pricing
could occur either because firms can exercise monopsony power in the
purchase of inputs or because the sellers of inputs can exercise market power.
Thus, to reiterate, it is possible for the φjs to be positively signed (input-buyer
power) or negatively signed (input-seller power).
III AN EMPIRICAL APPLICATION TO IRISH MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES
3.1 Data
The electronic version of the Irish Census of Production (CIP) database, as
published by the Central Statistics Office (CSO), is employed to test for the
presence of potential market power in Irish manufacturing industry
industries. For each year, the full dataset provides information on 138 four-
digit industrial sectors. 
An attractive feature of the Roeger version of the test which we use is that
the basic data required are denominated as the log changes in the value of
outputs and inputs. Therefore, one does not need to employ separate estimates
of prices and quantities to implement the test. This is especially attractive in
the case of capital, where it is notoriously difficult to generate stock data,
especially at the four-digit level.
From the CIP, data are available on the nominal value of each sector’s gross
output together with each sector’s expenditure on “Materials”, “Services”,
“Fuel and Power”, “Industrial Employment” and “Other Employment”. Under
the assumption of constant returns to scale, capital costs are implicitly given
as “the remainder of net output”. At the commencement of this study we had
access to nine years of such data from 1991 to 1999. 
The dataset allowed us to form a panel. In forming the panel we had to
ensure that the same four-digit sector aggregates were available each year.
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related to certain structural features of manufacturing industries, such as, the
ownership status (foreign versus indigenous), we felt it was important to
generate separate coefficients for each broad manufacturing sector (that is,
the two-digit level).8 We confined the analysis to those broad manufacturing
sectors for which we had a sufficient number of observations to conduct a
separate regression analysis for each sector. These considerations resulted in
109 four-digit level observations across 17 broad manufacturing sectors being
available for each year. As we lose one year’s data due to the regression
variables being defined in terms of log changes, the total number of
observations in the panel is 8 × 109 = 872 for the period 1992 to 1999. 
3.2 Regression Analysis and Results
We exploit the panel nature of our data to test for possible differences in the
market-power coefficients between broad manufacturing sectors by estimating
a “fixed-effects” version of Equation (7)9
j=M                         k=L   j=M
vikt =   φj1  zij1t +       γjk zijkt Dk + εikt (8)
j=2                         k=2    j=2
where, i=1,…, N denotes the four-digit level observation; k=1,…, L denotes the
broad manufacturing sector (two-digit level); t=1,…, 8 denotes the years; the
γs have the usual interpretation as the difference between the market-power
coefficient value for a single broad manufacturing sector (k=1) and each of the
remaining two-digit sectors (k=2,…,L) and D is a dummy variable that takes
a value of 1 if the observation falls into the kth sector (k=2,…,L) and zero
otherwise; and j=1 is defined as the capital input and j=2,…, M denotes the
remaining production inputs, “Materials”(2), “Services”(3), “Fuel and
Power”(4), “Industrial Employment”(5) and “Other Employment”(6).
Thus we assume constant market-power coefficients within each broad
industrial sector and over the time period of the study but we allow the
coefficients to differ between each broad manufacturing sector. Hence the
variation in the data that enable us to estimate the coefficients involves a
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8 It would be interesting to be able to discriminate between four-digit sectors on the basis of
ownership status but the available data only allows us to discriminate on this basis at the two-
digit level.
9 This estimation approach is equivalent to running separate regressions for each two-digit
manufacturing sector.combination of cross-sectional and time-series variation across the four-digit
observations within each broad industrial sector.10
The market-power coefficients for each broad manufacturing sector are
thus generated as 
φjk = φj1 +  γjk;  k = 2, ..., M (9) 
with associated standard errors.
Estimation of Equation (8) using OLS (with White-adjusted standard
errors) yielded the results given in Table 1. The R
–
2 value was 0.56 and the LM-
autocorrelation value was 0.14 with a standard error of 0.09.11 Our results
thus imply the presence of market power given the Hall-Roeger interpretation
of our estimated equation.
A likelihood-ratio test for equality of the market-power coefficients (the
φjks), within each broad manufacturing sector, produced a value of 366 with 17
degrees of freedom which substantially exceeds the critical χ2 value. Thus we
strongly reject the null hypothesis of equality of the market-power coefficients
within each broad manufacturing sector which rejects the possibility that the
source of market power is likely to be due to monopoly pricing of outputs. In
Appendix 1 we present estimates of the Hall-Roeger output-based monopoly-
power coefficients that are obtained by restricting the input market-power
coefficients to be equal. It is apparent that there is little evidence of monopoly
power in the setting of output prices. This finding, together with rejection of
equality of the input-based market-power coefficients within the
manufacturing sectors, provides support for the hypothesis that the source of
market power lies in imperfect competition in the pricing of inputs. A
likelihood-ratio test also strongly rejected the hypothesis that there was no
significant difference in the market-power coefficients between manufacturing
sectors12.
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10Both Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995) conduct their regression analyses for US manufacturing by
exploiting time- series variation at the two-digit level for the period 1953-1984. Our study has the
advantage of being undertaken at the four-digit level but we need to exploit both cross-sectional
and time-series variation to generate sufficient observations for estimation. While Hall and
Roeger use a longer time-period than ours, the reasonableness of the implied assumption of
constant market-power coefficients over such a long time period can be questioned.
11 The Lagrange Multiplier test for first-order autocorrelation was obtained by regressing the
residuals from Equation (8) on their lagged values and the other right-hand-side variables. We
also estimated Equation (8) using a first-order autocorrelation-corrected estimator and the
resulting autocorrelation coefficient was also not statistically different from zero.
12 We also carried out a number of robustness checks of our findings. These involved running the
regressions for a dataset that omitted “influential” observations and using the Least Absolute
Difference estimator. While both of these estimation approaches led to a reduction in the
magnitude of the coefficients of market power, we still strongly rejected the null hypothesis of
equality of the coefficients for each input within and between broad manufacturing sectors.We now turn to the coefficient estimates themselves which we interpret as
indicating the presence of market power in the pricing of inputs. Under this
interpretation, the φjks equal the difference between the implied marginal
value product of the inputs and their corresponding prices expressed as a ratio
of actual input prices. For ease of interpretation we multiply these coefficient
estimates by 100 giving us the percentage difference between the value of the
marginal products and input prices. These adjusted estimates are presented
in Table 1.
We find a preponderance of significant market-power coefficient estimates
for the “Materials” (13 sectors) and “Services” (11 sectors) inputs. About seven
sectors report statistically significant values for “Industrial Employment”
with five and four sectors respectively returning statistically significant
values for “Other Employment” and “Fuel and Power”.
As to the magnitude of the coefficients, we find that about eight sectors
report a market-power coefficient for “Materials” that is greater than or equal
to 0.5 per cent. Interestingly, while we do find statistically significant evidence
of market power in the purchase of materials for the food industry, the
magnitude of the market-power coefficient is relatively low at about 0.6 per
cent. 
The finding of a negative and large market-power coefficient for “Services”
for several sectors is interesting. The result implies that the sectors in
question are paying substantially more for these inputs than their internal
marginal value to the industries concerned. About seven sectors report a
market-power coefficient for “Services” that is greater than or equal to –5 per
cent. Around eight sectors return an estimated market-power coefficient in
respect of “Industrial Employment” that exceeds or equals 1 per cent.
Three sectors stand out as having especially large and statistically
significant market-power coefficients in respect of “Materials”, “Services” and
“Industrial Employment”, namely, “Textiles”, “Chemicals” and “Fabricated
Metals”. As far as the labour input is concerned, “Textiles” stands out as
possibly being afflicted by monopsonistic-type conditions in that the market
power coefficient is found to be 10 per cent for “Other Employment” and over
3 per cent for “Industrial Employment”.
Our estimates indicate a much lower order of market power than those
produced by Roeger for the US, who in turn obtained substantially lower
estimates than Hall. This is not unexpected given the presumption that the
Irish case corresponds closely to the small-open-economy paradigm.
Nonetheless, the contrasting estimate magnitudes are noteworthy. Roeger
reports the percentage difference between price and marginal cost, expressed
relative to marginal cost, ranging from 15 per cent for the textile sector to 214
per cent for public utilities (electricity, gas and sanitary services).
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Table 1: Market-Power Coefficient Estimates (%) for Irish Manufacturing
Industries, 1991-1999 (standard errors in parentheses)
Broad Manufacturing  φ2 φ3 φ4 φ5 φ6
Sector Materials Services Fuel and Other Industrial
(Obs.=NxT)a Power Employ- Employ-
ment ment
Food 0.60 –4.70 –6.10 1.40 1.50
(104) (0.20)** (2.30)** (2.90)** (1.70) (1.10)
Textiles 1.00 –19.20 –12.10 10.00 3.40
(72) (0.50)** (6.70)** (5.10)** (4.10)** (1.90)*
Wearing Apparel 1.50 –3.60 2.20 1.30 –0.30
(32) (0.80)* (2.80) (5.80) (5.00) (1.70)
Wood & Wood Prods. 0.20 –7.00 –1.40 1.40 1.50
(32) (0.10)* (1.80)** (2.00) (1.10) (0.70)**
Pulp & Paper 0.50 –0.30 –2.80 –2.80 0.80
(32) (0.10)** (1.4) (1.90)* (1.20)** (0.40)**
Printing & Rec. Media –0.10 –1.00 3.20 –0.70 0.20
(40) (0.10) (1.00) (3.30) (0.40)* (0.30)
Chemicals 1.60 –12.60 –4.20 –3.60 0.40
(88) (0.60)** (6.20)** (4.10) (2.60) (4.80)
Rubber & Plastic 0.15 –0.60 –0.06 –0.30 0.60
(40) (0.00)** (0.40) (1.00) (0.40) (0.50)
Other Non-Metallic 0.60 –13.20 –1.90 –2.30 1.60
(72) (0.20)** (1.60)** (0.80)** (0.70)** (0.60)**
Fabricated Metals 0.10 –13.90 –9.50 4.70 5.30
(96) (0.30) (4.00)** (10.20) (3.00) (3.30)*
Machinery & Equipment 0.30 –3.60 –1.30 0.30 0.40
(80) (0.10)** (0.90)** (1.80) (0.50) (0.20)**
Electrical Machinery 0.30 –4.80 3.10 1.90 –0.20
(48) (0.20)* (2.40)** (4.20) (1.80) (0.50)
Radio, TV & Comm. Equip. 0.60 –7.60 11.80 0.50 –0.80
(24) (0.10)** (2.80)** (11.90) (1.10) (0.90)
Med., Prec. & Opt. Instrum.  –0.30 –18.80 –5.60 2.00 0.70
(24) (0.20)* (2.70)** (4.20) (1.40)* (0.80)
Motor Vehicles –0.04 –3.90 –3.40 –0.14 2.00
(24) (0.10) (1.30)** (2.90) (2.00) (0.20)**
Other Trans. Equip. –1.20 –0.80 29.10 –12.90 5.10
(24) (2.40) (6.60) (30.60) (9.00) (3.30)*
Furniture 1.50 2.80 3.60 3.40 2.30
(40) (0.80)** (6.40) (15.20) (5.40) (3.70)
a: Since the coefficients reported here are based on the estimation of a “fixed-effects”
model, the relevant number of observations for the regression analysis is N × T = 872
with 787 degrees of freedom.
φ2 = materials; φ3 = services; φ4 = fuel and power; φ5 = “other” employment; φ6 =
industrial employment.
*: denotes statistically significant at the 90 per cent confidence level.
**: denotes statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level.IV  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has applied Roeger’s version of Hall’s non-parametric test of
market power to Irish manufacturing four-digit industries. The paper
demonstrates the equivalence of output-based and input-based versions of the
test and suggests that tests of “market power” is a more neutral and
acceptable term. The paper also proposes a simple test that is capable of
discriminating between imperfect competition in the pricing of outputs and
inputs.
A number of the findings are worth noting. We find evidence of statistically
significant market power in the pricing of a number of production inputs. We
strongly reject the hypothesis that the market-power coefficients are similar
across two-digit industrial sectors. Our results also suggest that the source of
market power is most likely due to the pricing of inputs rather than outputs.
This finding, at the four-digit manufacturing sector, confirms the strong prior
of price-taking behaviour in output markets that has been found in several
previous Irish studies using more aggregated data.
While we find statistical support for the presence of market power in the
pricing of inputs in many sectors, the sectors where the exercise of market
power appears to be most prevalent are: “Food”, “Textiles”, “Wood and Wood
Products”, “Pulp and Paper”, “Other non-Metallic” and “Medical Precision and
Optical Instruments”. With the exception perhaps of the “Other non-Metallic”
sector, there is no obvious pattern that can be discerned here in terms of
export orientation or ownership status (foreign versus indigenous).
The economic importance of the finding of market power in input pricing
that we find for many sectors has to be tempered by the relatively small
magnitude of the coefficients in most cases. However, there are a number of
coefficients that would appear to be of prima facie importance. For instance,
the finding that the market-power coefficient for “Other Employment” is about
10 per cent in the “Textiles” sector implies a labour supply elasticity to the
sector of about 10. While most of the estimates imply an elasticity which is
much higher than this, these are still at odds with the assumption of an
infinitely elastic labour supply which is implied by the competitive model. This
finding could have implications for the impact of minimum wages in this
sector. It is also worth noting that the sectors where we find evidence of
relatively sizeable buyer power in regard to labour inputs tend to be also the
relatively most intensive users of labour. For instance, for the last year of our
analysis, the share of “Wages and Salaries” in total output was over 24 per
cent for “Textiles” and in excess of 30 per cent for “Other Transport
Equipment”.
In many respects the most surprising result is the statistically significant
300 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWand relatively large negative market-power coefficient that is obtained for
“Services”13 for several sectors. This input comprises activities that firms must
acquire on a consulting basis (e.g. accounting and legal services, etc.). The
implication here is that these inputs are priced significantly above their
marginal value to the sectors concerned. Indeed, in some cases, the price of
“Services” appears to be substantially ahead of its internal value to firms. This
is a finding that would appear to merit much further study because it could
indicate an uncompetitive structure in the supply of “Services” to firms.14
In conclusion, it is important that attention is drawn to the caveats that
attend to the methodology employed in this paper. Both Hall and Roeger
acknowledge a number of alternative explanations to the presence of market
power that could explain the finding of a statistically significant gap between
the primal and dual versions of the Solow residual. The methodology assumes
a constant-returns-to-scale technology and it is incapable of distinguishing
between a market-power and an increasing-returns effect. It is difficult to
have strong priors about what sectors might be expected to exhibit increasing
returns at the four-digit level of aggregation but, on the face of it, none of the
sectors for which we obtain sizeable coefficient values would appear to fall into
this category. Another possible explanation for the results is that both the
suppliers and buyers of inputs may enjoy relatively different bargaining
strengths at different points of the economic cycle and hence the gap between
marginal value products and actual input prices may arise because of
adjustment lags. This would be an interesting idea for further research
because it suggests that the estimates of market power may vary over time
and this hypothesis could be tested given the availability of more time series
observations.
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Industries, 1991-1999 Assuming that Only Monopoly Power is Present 









Wood & Wood Prods. 0.19
(32) (0.08)**
Pulp & Paper 0.25
(32) (0.06)**














Radio, TV & Comm. Equip. 0.50
(24) (0.06)**








a: These estimates are obtained from the estimation of Equation 3(a).
**: Denotes statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level.
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